Robert Pearson, Robert Pearson Construction v. Suzanne J. Lamb : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Robert Pearson, Robert Pearson Construction v.
Suzanne J. Lamb : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David M. Bennion; Michael P. Petrogeorge; Parsons Behle and Latimer; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
David B. Thompson; Miller Vance and Thompson; Attorneys for Defendant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Pearson v. Lamb, No. 20040613 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5132
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT 
PEARSON CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 20040613-CA 
SUZANNE J. LAMB, 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
Defendant/Appellant. r^'JiMENT 
K f U 
-«m 
REPLY BRIEF OF A P P E L L A N T £ Q Q K E T
 M r t ^OOHOtefe-CA 
Appeal from a Final Judgment Entered 
By the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, Presiding 
DAVID M. BENNION (5664) 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE (8870) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
2200 North Park Avenue, Suite D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, Utah 84068 
Telephone: (435) 649-8209 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 0 5 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT PEARSON dba ROBERT 
PEARSON CONSTRUCTION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 20040613-CA 
SUZANNE J. LAMB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Final Judgment Entered 
By the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, Presiding 
DAVID M. BENNION (5664) 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE (8870) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159) 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
2200 North Park Avenue, Suite D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, Utah 84068 
Telephone: (435) 649-8209 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 1 
A. Mr. Pearson fails to show that his noncompliance with UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001) was not a jurisdictional 
defect or that Mrs. Lamb could waive that defect 1 
B. Under the plain language of section 38-1-11 (4)(a), Pearson 
was required to comply with its requirements as a precondition 
to enforcement of his mechanic's lien; that Lamb or any other 
owner of a residence who is the target of a lien foreclosure action 
ultimately has no rights to exercise under the Residence Lien Act 
does not relieve the lien claimant of the obligation to comply 
with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) 6 
C. Suggestions that Lamb's counsel has acted in bad faith by raising 
the jurisdictional issue are unwarranted 10 
D. Lamb is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs in defending 
against Pearson's mechanic's lien action in the trial court and 
on appeal 14 
CONCLUSION 15 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 919 P.2d 547 
(Utah 1996) 3 
Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003) 12 
Chambers v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 878 P.2d 1164 
(UtahCt. App. 1994) 11 
Cocco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 15 Ohio Law Abs. 391, 1933 WL 
1523 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933) 3 
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 
272 P.2d 177 (1954) 6 
84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 1297 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) 12 
Farmers' Cash Union v. Elswood, 67 Utah 501, 248 P. 477 (1926) 12 
Financial Design Consultants, Inc. v. McCarver, 712 S.W.2d 738 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986) 2 
Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95, 61 P.3d 989 8 
Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Construction Co., 546 So.2d 1099 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1988) 2 
Holding Electric, Inc. v. Roberts , 530 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1988) 2 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372 (Utah 1997) 11 
Landmark Systems, Inc. v. Delmar Redevelopment Corp., 900 S.W.2d 258 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 6, 9 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 4 
Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1995) 12 
ii 
Redwood Uym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 i\2cl 1138 
(Utah 1981) 8 
Richards v. Security Pacific National Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) 14 
S.B. Luttrell & Co. v. Knoxville, L. & J.R. Co., 105 S.W. 565 
(Tenn. 1907) 2 
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) 4, 5 
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,4 P.3d 795 7, 8 
Constitutional & Statutory Provisions 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11 (2001) passim 
UTAHCODEANN. § 38-1-18 (2001) 14 
11 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Mr. Pearson fails to show that his noncompliance with UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 38-l-ll(4)(a) (2001) was not a jurisdictional defect or that Mrs, Lamb 
could waive that defect. 
In response to Mrs. Lamb's argument that the trial court erred in denying her 
motion to dismiss Mr. Pearson's mechanic's lien action for lack of jurisdiction due to 
noncompliance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), Pearson contends that 
Lamb waived her section 38-1-1 l(4)(a)-based argument by (1) not asserting it as an 
affirmative defense in her answer, (2) stipulating before trial that Pearson had complied 
with all of the statutory procedural requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a 
mechanic's lien, and (3) failing to raise the argument either at trial or in a timely post-
trial motion. As explained below, none of those waiver arguments has merit because 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is jurisdictional. 
At the heart of Pearson's attack on Lamb's jurisdictional analysis is his 
contention that section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) creates a mere affirmative defense, which can be 
waived. As support for that argument, Pearson cites two decisions from other 
jurisdictions: Hodusa Corp. v. Abray Construction Co., 546 So.2,d 1099 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1988), and S.B. Luttrell & Co. v. Knoxville, L. & J.R. Co., 105 S.W. 565 (Tenn. 
1907). Aple.'sBr. at 15-16. 
In Hodusa, the Florida Court of Appeals, citing a Florida Supreme Court 
decision, Holding Electric, Inc. v. Roberts, 530 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1988), stated, without 
analysis, that a contractor's failure to furnish the homeowner with the affidavit of 
payment to subcontractors and suppliers required under Florida's mechanics' lien 
statutes "does not create a jurisdictional defect," even though "the furnishing of the 
affidavit is a condition precedent to bringing an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien." 
Hodusa, 546 So.2d at 1101. In Holding, the court, analyzing a series of conflicting 
decisions from the Florida Court of Appeals, held that under the specific circumstances 
presented in the case at bar, "delivery of the contractor's affidavit is not jurisdictional, 
although it is a prerequisite to maintaining the action and must be completed within the 
statutory limitation period." 530 So.2d at 303. In S.B. Luttrell & Co., the Tennessee 
Supreme Court similarly held that a lien claimant's failure to provide a statutorily 
required notice to the target of the lien could be waived. 
First, the cases Pearson cites by no means represent the only view on the issue. 
RPP P Q Financial Design Consultants, Inc. v. McCarver, 112 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Mo. 
2 
Ct. App. 1986) (trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to impose mechanic's lien 
in favor of original contractor in absence of pleading and proof that written statutory 
notice was provided to owner); Cocco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 15 Ohio Law Abs. 
391, 1933 WL 1523, *2,*3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933) (subcontractor's failure to provide 
statutorily required statement to surety constituted jurisdictional defect). 
Second, whatever value the Hodusa and S.B. Luttrell & Co. decisions may have 
in interpreting Florida and Tennessee law, they are of little help in construing the Utah 
provisions at issue here. That is so principally because in neither of those cases is there 
any indication the court was applying an analytical framework similar to that which the 
Utah appellate courts have adopted for determining whether a particular statutory 
procedural requirement is jurisdictional. As noted in Lamb's opening brief, in Utah the 
formula for determining that question is set forth in Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996), and Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 
P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980): The inquiry is whether the statutory requirement is 
"mandatory" (jurisdictional) or merely "directory" (not jurisdictional); and a court is 
guided by the principle that a direction in a statute to do an act generally is considered 
"mandatory" when coupled with consequences for the failure to so act and, conversely, 
when a statute requires an action without attaching penalties to the failure to so act, the 
requirement generally is not considered "mandatory." 
Pearson does not dispute that Beaver County and Stahl give us that formula; 
however, he attempts to avoid its application in construing sections 38-1-1 l(4)(a) and 
3 
(e) by manufacturing a nonexistent limitation on the formula. He contends that all of 
the cases Lamb has cited as support for applying the formula here "involved the unique 
question of whether a statutory provision setting forth a 'statutory time frame' 
constituted a jurisdictional requirement" and "[i]t was ultimately the coupling of a 
statutory time frame and the bar to enforcement that was critical in those cases, [with] 
the jurisdictional requirement * * * found only where such coupling occurred." Aple.'s 
Br. at 17, 18. Based on that contention, he reasons that "[b]ecause Section 38-1-11(4) 
is not a statute of limitation provision in the first instance, and because there is no 
coupling between a statutory time frame and a bar to enforcement, these cases have no 
application * * *, and no jurisdictional requirement should be found." Aple.'s Br. at 
18. For the reasons that follow, that reasoning is flawed. 
Nothing in any of the cited cases even suggests that the Beaver County I Stahl 
formula applies exclusively to the situation where a "statutory time frame" is in issue. 
One need only examine how the court in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1988), for example, discussed the issue before it {viz., whether certain statutory 
procedural requirements in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are jurisdictional) to 
reject Pearson's contention: 
Section 63-30-11 provides that before a plaintiff may maintain an action 
against the State, he or she must file a notice of claim with the appropriate 
state entity. Section 63-30-12 provides that an action against the State is 
barred if the required notice is not filed. It therefore makes failure to give 
notice grounds for dismissal. A plain reading of those sections indicates 
that no suit against the State may be maintained if notice is not given. We 
therefore conclude that service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
4 
769 P.2d at 249 (footnote and citations omitted; emphasis added). It is clear from the 
foregoing that the essential "coupling" - for purposes of determining whether failure to 
comply with the notice of claim provisions deprives the trial court of subject matter 
jurisdiction - was the coupling between the notice requirement and an express bar to 
suit if that requirement is not satisfied. Contrary to Pearson's assessment, the court did 
not make the statutory time frame the centerpiece of its decision. 
In addition to the Madsen opinion, the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Stahl, 
where the notice requirement was found to be directory rather than mandatory, also 
provides a good illustration of how the test is applied, by drawing an instructive 
distinction between the statutes at issue in Madsen and the additional statutes analyzed 
in Stahl: 
The express bar against maintaining an action for noncompliance with the 
notice provision in the Governmental Immunity Act, when compared with 
the Utah Public Transit District Act, which contains no such language, 
indicates an intent on the part of the Legislature not to impose a bar for 
noncompliance with the notice provision of the latter act. 
618 P.2d at 481-82. 
In sum, the test for determining whether a statutory procedural requirement is 
mandatory (jurisdictional) or merely directory (not jurisdictional) calls for a two-step 
examination of the statute's plain language: First, does the statute require a prescribed 
act and, second, does the statute expressly attach a consequence for not doing the act? 
Applying that test here, the inescapable conclusion is that subsections (a) and (e) of 38-
5 
1-11(4) set forth a procedural requirement that is jurisdictional.1 See Landmark 
Systems, Inc. v. Delmar Redevelopment Corp., 900 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995) (notice provision in Missouri's mechanic's lien statutes is "mandatory"; the 
statute states that "[compliance with [the notice requirement] shall be a condition 
precedent to the creation, existence or validity of any mechanic's lien in favor of [the] 
original contractor). 
B. Under the plain language of section 38-1-11(4)(a), Pearson was required to 
comply with its requirements as a precondition to enforcement of his 
mechanic's lien; that Lamb or any other owner of a residence who is the 
target of a lien foreclosure action ultimately has no rights to exercise under 
the Residential Lien Act does not relieve the lien claimant of the obligation 
to comply with section 38-l-ll(4)(a), 
For the first time in this Court, Pearson argues that the notice requirements of 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) should not apply to him because Lamb had no rights to assert 
under the Residential Lien Act, to which those notice requirements pertain. Below, 
1
 Pearson argues that the term "barred" in section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) must be read as 
imposing nothing more than the "bar" an affirmative defense presents to the 
enforcement of an otherwise valid action, and thus (4)(e) creates only an affirmative 
defense, which can be waived. Aple.'s Br. at 18-19. That argument, however, cannot 
be squared with the analysis in Madsen, where the court construed statutory provisions 
containing the identical term "barred" and concluded that those provisions create a 
jurisdictional precondition to suit. This Court would have to ignore Madsen to adopt 
Pearson's view. Further, the Court would have to assume the Legislature, when it 
enacted section 38-1-11(4) in 2001, was unaware of how three years earlier the Madsen 
court had construed the term "barred" in similar provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, and that the Legislature intended a different meaning for the term in the 
mechanic's lien statutes. That would contravene settled rules of statutory construction. 
See Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 261, 272 
P.2d 177, 180 (1954) (when construing a statute, a court assumes that when the 
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Pearson argued that section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) did not apply to him because the Residence 
Lien Act is not intended to protect an owner of residential rental property like Lamb -
an argument the trial court adopted. On appeal, Pearson makes no effort to defend the 
latter argument; therefore, it must be assumed he has abandoned it in favor of the 
former, new argument. For the following reasons, the fact that Lamb or some other 
residence owner served with a mechanic's lien foreclosure action ultimately has no 
rights to assert under the Residence Lien Act is irrelevant to interpreting the plain 
language of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). 
When interpreting a statute, a court "look[s] beyond the plain language only if 
[it] find[s] some ambiguity." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 1 25, 4 P.3d 795. Section 
38-1-1 l(4)(a) unambiguously states that "[i]f a lien claimant files an action to enforce a 
lien filed under this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the 
lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of the 
residence [certain instructions and forms relating to the exercise of rights under the 
Residence Lien Act]." The statute does not limit the instructions/forms requirement to 
those situations where the owner of the residence actually has rights to exercise under 
the Residence Lien Act. Nor does it exempt from that requirement a lien claimant who 
may believe that the owner has no such rights. 
legislature enacted the statute, it was aware of prior court decisions construing similar 
statutory language). 
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Whether or not an owner actually is in a position to exercise rights under the 
Residence Lien Act is irrelevant to this Court's determination of what legislative intent 
the unambiguous language of (4)(a) reflects - that is, a clear intent that all lien 
claimants serve the required instructions and forms and thereby give the intended notice 
of a homeowner's rights under the Act. Obviously, the Legislature did not want the 
lien claimant deciding whether the homeowner in a given case is in a position to 
exercise rights under the Act; it wanted to ensure that the sued homeowner would be 
the one making that decision, informed by the instructions and forms served in 
compliance with (4)(a). Imparting notice of rights to the target homeowner is the clear 
purpose of (4)(a), and this Court must construe that subsection accordingly. See Burns, 
2000 UT 56 at \ 25 ("[0]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve."). 
Pearson's view that serving the required instructions and forms on Lamb or 
other homeowners in her position would be "futile and unnecessary" is of no import. 
The Legislature has decided otherwise, and "[i]t is not the function of this Court to 
evaluate the wisdom or practical necessities of legislative enactments." Redwood Gym 
v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981). See also Gottling 
v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95, 1 23, 61 P.3d 989 ("Indeed, this court cannot 
ignore or strike down an act because it is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of 
wisdom is for the legislature to determine. We need not agree with the legislature as a 
8 
matter of public policy. * * * What the legislature 'should' do is not the question. 
Rather it is what the legislature has done." (citations, brackets, and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). In short, Pearson cannot escape the mandatory requirements of 
section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) simply because he thinks they are a bad idea under certain 
circumstances. 
In the Landmark case cited above, the Missouri Court of Appeals correctly 
rejected a similar attack on a notice requirement in that state's mechanic's lien statutes, 
where the lien claimant argued that its failure to comply with the notice requirement 
should not bar its lien because the liened property owner was "a large corporation 
sophisticated in the areas of real estate and construction" and "had knowledge of the 
mechanic's lien law": 
It is true, as [the lien claimant] suggests, the purpose of § 429.012 
is to warn inexperienced property owners of the danger to them which 
lurks in the mechanic's lien statute. However, this court is also aware the 
requirements of our statute are mandatory. The statute does not limit the 
necessity of this notice to those inexperienced with, or having lack of 
knowledge about, the mechanic's lien laws. The statute has no exceptions 
and this court will not accept the invitation to create an exception in this 
case. Additionally, * * * allowing a lien where there was not substantial 
compliance with the notice provision contained in § 429.012 would add 
another issue to each mechanic's lien case, namely the extent of the 
property owner's knowledge of the mechanic's lien laws. The fact such 
an exception was not incorporated into the statute indicates the legislature 
did not intend such a result. 
900 S.W.2d at 261-62 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That analysis 
applies with equal force here in determining the scope of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a)'s 
application. In short, the statute plainly applies to all lien claimants, Pearson included. 
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The Legislature did not carve out any exceptions to the instructions/forms requirement, 
and this Court should not create one. 
C. Suggestions that Lamb's counsel has acted in bad faith by raising the 
jurisdictional issue are unwarranted. 
At various points in Pearson's brief, his counsel suggest that Lamb's counsel has 
acted in bad faith by raising the jurisdictional issue concerning Pearson's mechanic's 
lien action. Their criticism of Lamb's counsel's actions is particularly harsh in their 
response to the argument that the parties made a mutual mistake regarding the pretrial 
stipulation that Pearson had complied with all of the statutory procedural requirements 
for perfecting and enforcing a mechanic's lien: 
Mrs. Lamb has competent and experienced trial counsel, and it is unlikely 
even a unilateral "mistake" was made. Counsel likely realized prior to 
entering the Stipulation that any notice under Section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) was 
unnecessary because Mrs. Lamb had no actual rights to enforce. * * * 
After trial, faced with a disappointed and disgruntled client after trial, he 
likely searched for any theory to avoid the award of attorneys' fees and 
costs, coming up with the only possible argument he could as to why the 
lien (and, more importantly, the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs) should not be enforced, and the voluntarily entered Stipulation 
should be ignored. 
Aple.'s Br. at 14 n.9. That speculative indictment of counsel's actions demands a 
response. 
There is no dispute that the parties' counsel, at the suggestion of Lamb's 
counsel, entered into a pretrial stipulation stating what counsel in good faith believed to 
be true - namely, that Pearson had complied with all of the statutory procedural 
requirements for perfecting and foreclosing on a mechanic's lien. As Lamb's counsel 
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stated in the supplemental motion for reconsideration (new trial) filed in the trial court, 
the jurisdictional question presented by Pearson's noncompliance with section 38-1-
ll(4)(a) was "an issue which Lamb's counsel just discovered in reviewing the statute 
pertaining to an action to foreclose on a mechanics' lien." Supp. Motion at 2 (R. 372). 
Contrary to Pearson's counsel's speculation, the discovery and presentation of the 
jurisdictional issue was not the result of a desperate effort to manufacture any argument 
to avoid an attorney fee award so as to placate a "disappointed and disgruntled client." 
Rather, Lamb's counsel was, in his view, guilty of an oversight; he simply had misread 
section 38-1-11(4) at the time the pretrial stipulation was agreed to, and he later 
discovered his mistake. That occasionally occurs in this business. See, e.g., Kearns-
Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1997) ("[T]he parties and the 
court seem to have misread the statute * * *."); Chambers v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 
878 P.2d 1164, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("The trial court simply misread the statute 
* * * »\ 
Having discovered the jurisdictional issue late in the process, Lamb's counsel 
was obligated to advise both his client and the court of the oversight as quickly as 
possible. Knowing that lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time and that a 
jurisdictional defect cannot be waived or stipulated around, counsel presented the 
jurisdictional issue to the court as soon as he became aware of it. An attorney has a 
duty to inform a court of any matter bearing on its jurisdiction, just as every court has a 
duty to raise the question of jurisdiction even when the parties have not done so. See 
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Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995) ("subject matter 
jurisdiction is an issue that can and should be addressed when jurisdiction is 
questionable"); Farmers9 Cash Union v. Elswood, 67 Utah 501, 248 P. 477, 478 (1926) 
("While it is the undoubted right of either party to raise a jurisdictional issue at any 
time, it is likewise the duty of this court, on its own motion, to see that it does not 
transcend its jurisdiction in any matter pending before it."); Bridgmon v. Array Sys. 
Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 575 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that courts have a duty to raise 
question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte). Indeed, as at least one court has 
said, "an attorney[] [has an] ethical obligation, as an officer of the court, to 
immediately raise before a trial court the fundamental issue of lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, after it becomes apparent[.]" 84Lumber Company v. Cooper, 656 So.2d 
1297, 1300 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994). 
Regarding the parties' pretrial stipulation, Pearson states: "Mrs. Lamb's counsel 
had an affirmative obligation to review all of the statutory provisions, and to fully 
analyze all of her potential rights thereunder, before advising her to forgo the technical 
challenges and enter the Stipulation. Mrs. Lamb, not Mr. Pearson, must bear the 
burden of any failure to do so, and cannot avoid the Stipulation now by claiming a 
mistake." Aple.'s Br. at 14 (footnote omitted). There is no denying that Lamb's 
counsel was obligated to review all of the relevant statutes before advising his client to 
enter the stipulation. He did that but regrettably made an error. 
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It is equally true, however, that Pearson's counsel had an equivalent obligation 
to review those same statutes for the purpose of making a joint representation to the 
trial court - through a stipulation - that Pearson had complied with all of the statutory 
procedural requirements for enforcement of his mechanic's lien, particularly where the 
court's jurisdiction depends on that compliance. Certainly, Pearson's counsel would 
not argue that it is proper to pursue a mechanic's lien foreclosure action, knowing that 
the court did not have jurisdiction to hear it, simply because the defendant's counsel has 
overlooked an unsatisfied statutory procedural requirement critical to jurisdiction. 
Lawyers have a duty not to file actions for which they know the court lacks 
jurisdiction. 
At bottom, a legitimate disagreement between counsel in this case as to the 
proper interpretation of section 38-1-11(4) does not warrant the sort of sharp allegations 
of bad faith that appear in Pearson's brief. If Lamb's jurisdictional argument were 
frivolous, that would be a different matter. The argument, however, has substantial 
support in Utah law and, therefore, is one counsel was obligated to present to the trial 
court, based on both his duty to competently and zealously represent his client and his 
duty promptly to inform the court of a genuine jurisdictional question when it became 
apparent.2 
Pearson also accuses Lamb of pursuing "meritless counterclaims" and "refusing] to 
discuss reasonable settlement," which, he claims, "exacerbated" his attorney fees. 
Aple.'s Br. at 10. First, the charge of bringing meritless counterclaims is undermined 
13 
D. Lamb is entitled to recover attorney fees and costs in defending against 
Pearson's mechanic's lien action in the trial court and on appeal. 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-148(1) (2001), the prevailing party in a 
mechanic's lien action is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs. That 
includes an appeal in such an action. Richards v. Security Pacific National Bank, 849 
P.2d 606, 612 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). Thus, if 
Lamb prevails in this appeal, she is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs for 
defending against Pearson's mechanic's lien action in this Court and the trial court. 
by the trial court's assessment of the case at the beginning of its written decision on the 
merits of the parties' competing claims: 
The case presents a classic example of the problems that arise when 
knowledgeable parties engage in such construction activities without any 
written contracts. Samuel Goldwyn's famous quip about "an oral contract 
is not worth the paper it is written on," while light hearted and 
nonsensical, applies here. The case presents a difficult decision for the 
court. The court does not decide this case purely on credibility as the 
parties suggest the court must. The court finds both parties to be decent, 
good people who see things from their differing perspective. Sitting in 
the chairs of the parties each no doubt sees the case as clear - plaintiff 
thinks it was his way, defendant thinks it is her way. The court believes 
both parties in almost all regards. 
Amended Memorandum Decision at 2 (R. 241) (Aple.'s Br., Addendum 5). 
Second, as for the charge of Lamb's alleged refusal to discuss reasonable 
settlement, not only is that an assertion unsupported by anything in the record, it 
represents nothing more than Pearson's personal view of what a "reasonable 
settlement" was in this case. It is hardly unusual for parties who have gone to trial to 
have been far apart in pretrial settlement negotiations. Which party may have been 
reasonable or unreasonable in those negotiations (if such could even be said) is not 
properly presented to this Court, whose only task is to decide a narrow legal question. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in Lamb's opening brief, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Pearson on his 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action and dismiss that action. The Court also should 
reverse the trial court's award of attorney fees to Pearson, as he is not a prevailing 
party under the mechanic's lien statutes. Finally, based on those reversals, the Court 
should remand the case to the trial court with directions to award Lamb her reasonable 
attorney fees and costs in defending against Pearson's invalid lien foreclosure action on 
appeal and below. 
Dated this 5^ day of March 2005. 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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